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The transfer of power in 1946 ignitedtensions between the Liberals and the
Conservatives of Colombia. Ousted from a 16 year political domination, the Liberals
were replaced from the presidency by the newly elected Conservative Mariano Ospina
Perez. Though Congress was still controlled by the Liberals, t}re Conservatives
(particularly in rural areas) saw their chance through their regaining of power to now
repress the Liberals out of fear that they would rebel. Through violence and exclusion,
Colombians through the years of the 1940s-1950s, not only witnessed their political
system threatened, but watched it rupture.
Quickly, a democratically elected administration became repressive and
dictatorial. While Ospina was catering his politics to the elite, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan (a
Liberal and soon to be 3d party candidate for the 1950 presidential election) appealed to
the masses and mobilized them to demand that the government meet their growing
socioeconomic needs. However, while Gaitan's popularity was increasing, he was
assassinated on April 9, 1948.
Devastation broke out among Gaitanistic believers, followed by riots in
downtown Bogota where he was shot. Violence spread elsewhere once the news of
Gaitan's death was leaked out. Hence, La Violencia emerged in the beginnings of its
greatest stage and extended out all over Colombia, concentrating mostly, however, in the
Andes and the plains. Gaitan was an extremely influential figure to the masses who
believed that if he was put into powerthentheir worries would be over. La Violencia had
gained momentum with the tragrc loss of their leader and spilled out over the country in
revenge against the ruling powers.
The legacy that Gaitan left behind reminded the Colombian people that he was a
man of charisma, a voice for the masses, a challenge to the elite, a man of political
conflicts, and a man of great influence. Centally, my paper will be focused on Gaitan's
influehce on the masses, and how he mobilized them; how he and Conservative President
Ospina dealt with political, social, and economic matters; and lastly, how Gaitan's reform
and death hetped spur the event La Violencia.
On April 96, 1948, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan was shot and killed as he left his office in
Bogota. The murderer was a man named Roa who was acting independently with his own
reasons. Policemen locked Roa up in a nearby pharmacy while tending to Gaitan.
Onlookers who supported Gaitan's visions for Colombian people began to break out in
riots. Within an hour of the assassination, all eleven Bogota radio stations had been taken
over by various people grving instructions to the public to revolt. Citizens were told to
break into hardware stores to steel anything that could be used as a weapon and then to
storm the Presidential Palace. President Ospina hid in the palace waiting for
reinforcements to arrive to defend him.l
Gaitan's followers had included a number of policemen who began providing
arms to the rioters. Buildings and overturned tolley cars were set on fire. Through the
spread of the media, soon most of Colombia was set offinto a mass of violent events.
Thousands of people died in the riots. The three days of bloodshed that ensued have
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become known as the Bogotazo, which was recognized as one of the mosttragic events in
the history of Colombia.2
Why did Gaitan mean so much to the people of Colombia? He was the only
Colombian to have obtained major political stature by challenging the position of the elite
and appealing to the Colombian masses. "His actions threatened to erode the tacitly
understood boundaries of Colombian political contention and indeed to destroy the whole
framework of that "'Atlenian democracy'" within whose limits Colombian politics had
therefore been conducted."3
Gaitan had ran as an independent in the 1946 elections, and split the Liberal vote,
allowing Mariano Ospina Perez,the Conservative candidate, to be elected President. The
regime change ended the Liberals 16 year political domination, which created an
uneasiness for Gaitan and Liberal leaders, and stirred up their past rivalries. From the
Right, there were accusations that the incumbent congress had been fraudant$ elected
and that the Conservatives had been deprived of their rightful majority by the
machinations of the Liberal adminisfiation. For their part, the Liberals continued to think
themselves as the true majority in the country, only temporarily deprived of the
presidency by an unfortunate split in their pafi.a
To avoid conflicts with Congress, since they were majority Liberals, Ospina tried
to confront the situation by incorporating Liberals into a coalition govemment.5 Ospina
told the nation that he expected to rule with a Govemment of National Union involving
b|lq RoUot H., *L Violencia." lnColombia: Ttn Politicat Dimensions of Change, pg. 360-382. New
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both parties. He also promised to guarantee civil rights and prevent political reprisals.
Gaitan had affirmed that he would collaborate with Ospina as long as it was a coflrmon
agreement over social and economic programs of benefit to the people. However, Gaitan
also warned the incoming govenrment that if it initiated repressive and reactionary
policies he would then lead a general strike.6
Nonetheless, the Government of National Union was not premised upon common
agreemert over progftrms; it merely involved the participation of individuals. With that,
Ospina had failed to reach Gaitan over the terms of collaboration and appoirfied a cabinet
without consulting him. Gaitan immediately refused to cooperate, leaving the government
open to charges that it was a move by the oligarchs of both parties to defeat the interests
of the people and prevent the realization of popular demands.T
Gaitan went on and startedthe populist social movement, coined Gaitanism,
which supported democratic rather than a revolutionary path to reform. By advocating the
passing of more socially liberal policies, he appealed to the masses and he united urban
workers and campesinos. Many of the members of his own parly, as well as the
Conservatives, opposed Gaitan's program of reform. Yet it was less his proposals for
legislative or administrative action which aroused their fears than the sources of his
sfength and the manner in which he understood his appeals. Not the other party
primarily, but the oligarchy was the target; not the elite and their followers, but the
masses were the foundations of his support.8 Gaitan was seen as a "populist" in that he
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sought, through direct identification with the people, to express their resentment against
the privileged who governed Colombia and their hopes for a greater measure of social,
economic, and political democracy.e *The Gaitanism program was nationalistic, with
elements of non-Marxism socialism. Yet, it was likewise inftsed with much of the
traditional Liberal spirit, even while Gaitan vaguely talked of the suppression of the
historic parties by a union of the masses of them both."rO
Now, not only did Ospina have to deal with Gaitan and his movement, Ospina
also had to deal with the severe economic problems that he inherited from his
predecessors. The results for the majority without capital or influence meant that wages
were falling behind living costs, scarcities of staple goods, and unemployment. Ospina's
response was a conventional deflationary policy: cutbacks in government spending,
especially in public works; rationing of dollar exports; limitations on currency issue and
government bonds; and restrictions on credit. In alt, the government's economic poticy
largely worked against the interests of those with the greatest needs which also happened
to be the largest growing population.lr
In late 1946,the first stages of La Violencia began to break out in rural areas
which dealt with partisan conflict between Liberals and Conservatives. The
Conservatives first actions were direct, simple, and brutal. In swing-vote areas the
national police ranks were filled with Conservative sympathizers willing to carry out the
orders of Conservative officials. Liberal job holders were dismissed, and holders of
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Liberal identity cards intimidated. Liberal peasants were removed from their lands,
watched their property destroyed, and often were killed.t2 Ospina spoke out against La
Violencia, urgng respect and guarantees for all citizens. However, he failed to reach an
impact on the Colombian citizens. La Violencia began to accelerate in range and intensity
causing both parties to harden their ways and the government's actions appeared, to the
Liberals at least, increasingly partisan and repressive.
By the end of 1947, the government's control of the country appeared to be
slipping alvay. Violence was escalating to the point where arms and ammunition were
being carried over from Venezuela to Colombia in efforts to help out. Revolts broke out
everywhere and finally in January 1948, a state of siege was declared and the military
was brought in. During the same month the government placed some restrictions on radio
broadcasts and the press."
For Gaitan, he had failed to reconoile completely the contradictions inherent in his
various roles. His absorption in capturing the leadership of the Liberal party and
maintaining it as the majority political force in the country had slowed his pace. He had
not moved a meaningful program through congress nor formulated a viable opposition
policy. His efforts to maintain his position both as mass, popular leader and chiefl of a
taditional party over which he did not have the complete influence caused him to act
with great care. Gaitan knew that he could serve either the national country or the
political country, but not both.ra
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While political issues were at hand, underlying conditions of social and economic
change inthe Colombian countryside were now at heart and led certain kinds of men to
seek La Violencia as an outlet for the frusfrations of modernintion. Social, economic,
and psychological changes in the countryside, and the resulting disorganization of
haditional structures and values, gave the violence reason, as did poverty, tack of
education, and the frustrations created in a society where all material goods, all justice,
all honor, all opportunity and advantages in short, went to a very small group in
population. Beyond all the particular reasons for the violence, and contributing to its
perpetuation once begun, was a growing feeling among lower-class Colombians that
somehow the governing elite and the traditional institutions had failed. Once authority
and traditional ways were questioned, a general moral breakdown or "spiritual
disorientation" had set in. *A kind of anarchy, which perhaps tends to be the antithesis of
hierarchical atrthority patterns in a political culture like the Colombian, took the place of
the accustomed deference and reyerence."ls
In early April, Ospina was preparing for the Ninth Inter-American Conference
while also combining a Conservative'Liberal delegation for the conference. Fears that
Gaitan would disrupt the conference, it was agreed that Gaitan would abstain from
making any public statements and or appearances at Ospina's request. Gaitan now
devoted his time to his law practice and kept to himself only going out to meet with close
friends. On Aprit 9, 1948, as Gaitan was leaving his law office he was shot by an
"Di4 Rob"rt H., "La Violencia." InColombia: The Politicat Dimensions af Chonge, pg. 360-382. New
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individual assassin.r6 Shocked by the tragic loss of their leader, Gaitan supporters ran out
to the streets and began the three day riots known as Bogotazo.
The bloody decade, known as La Violencia, ended in 1958, with over200,000
people killed throughout the events. It ended when the two parties drew up a power-
sharing pact, known as the National Front, which formally excluded other forces from the
electoral arena. But even as the National Front brought an end to the partisan violence
and consolidated the Liberal and Conservative hold on power, it genemted new forms of
opposition, ranging from nonconformists groups of the traditional parties to armed
guerrilla movements. I 7
Gaitan had succeeded in stirring the masses without providing them with any
channel for the expression of the emotions he had quickened other than through the
identification with his person. What govems is a name and a mystique, which continue to
be invoked on suitable occasions by Liberal leaders, including many who opposed Gaitan
while he was alive, and by virtually all parties and factions on the Colombian political
Left. What survives, too, is the memory of Bogotazo, that great anomic explosion which
expressed fury of the people at the loss of their idol. Part republican legalist, part populist
demagogic; at times verbally revolutionary, at heart a reformer and moralizer; Gaitan
offered what to date has remained the most direct challenge to the continued rule of the
Colombianelite.
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